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THE PHILIP D. REED LECTURE SERIES 
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND 
CONFESSION OF ERROR 
Neal Kumar Katyal* 
 
PROF. CAPRA:  Good evening and thanks for coming.  I am Dan Capra, 
and I am the Philip Reed Chair at Fordham Law School.  The Reed Chair is 
devoted to a discussion on problems and issues involving litigation in 
federal and state courts.  Every year we have one of these and, as always, I 
want to thank the late Phil Reed Jr., who founded this Chair in 1996 to 
honor his father, Phil Reed, one of Fordham’s most distinguished graduates.  
It was designated as a rotating chair when I got it in 1996, and I am very 
happy not to have rotated out of it.  I thank the Law Review for all of its 
wonderful work and support of the Reed Chair programs throughout the 
years, and this year especially.  Tonight’s Reed Chair presentation is an 
address by Professor Neal Katyal of Georgetown Law School, who will 
speak about “The Solicitor General and Confession of Error.” 
Before I get to the proper introduction, I want to provide some personal 
background.  Neal’s connection with Fordham actually precedes that of his 
outstanding sister, my colleague Sonia Katyal.  Fordham met Neal at the 
“meat market” when he was still at Yale, and we tried to catch him there.  I 
read Neal’s piece discussing the use of heroin in New Haven.1  It was a 
fantastic piece for a young person.  The way I think about it now is that one 
should always make use of their surroundings while at law school.  But 
there you have it.  It was a great piece.  We tried our best to get him.  First 
he went to Judge Calabresi, then he went to Justice Breyer, and then he 
went on to other things. 
We crossed paths again when Neal worked for the Justice Department 
and had the temerity to intrude into the rulemaking process—in which I 
work—and oppose an amendment to Evidence Rule 701, which I had 
drafted.  I am proud to say that the amendment was approved, that it works 
 
*  Paul & Patricia Saunders Professor of National Security Law, Georgetown University.  
Professor Katyal served as Acting Solicitor General of the United States from May 2010 
until June 2011.  These remarks were made during a lecture at Fordham University School of 
Law on March 8, 2012.  The text of his remarks have been lightly edited.  The views 
expressed herein are his alone. 
 1. Neal Kumar Katyal, Deterrence’s Difficulty, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2385 (1997). 
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fine, that none of the doomsday prophecies that Neal presented to the 
Judicial Conference have come to pass—as far as I know—and that I think 
it is the only national rule ever enacted over the opposition of the Justice 
Department, which one can attribute to a number of things. 
Neal is a man of many and varied accomplishments.  While we did not 
get him to teach here, he has been here to present a number of Reed 
programs.  This is his third time.  I am personally honored that we have 
established this professional connection. 
Neal Katyal is the Paul and Patricia Saunders Professor of Law at 
Georgetown University and a partner at Hogan Lovells.  From 2010 to 
2011, Neal served as Acting Solicitor General of the United States, where 
he argued several major Supreme Court cases involving a variety of issues, 
such as his successful defense of the constitutionality of the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965, his victorious defense of former Attorney General John 
Ashcroft in the al-Kidd case2 for alleged abuses in the War on Terror, his 
unanimous victory against eight states who sued the nation’s leading power 
plants for contributing to global warming, and a variety of other matters.  
As Acting Solicitor General, Neal was responsible for representing the 
federal government of the United States in all appellate matters before the 
U.S. Supreme Court and the Courts of Appeals throughout the United 
States.  He served as counsel of record hundreds of times, orally argued 
fifteen U.S. Supreme Court cases, as well as numerous cases in the lower 
courts.  He was also the only head of the Solicitor General’s Office to argue 
a case in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit on the question 
of whether certain aspects of the human genome are patentable.   
Neal has served as a law professor for fifteen years at Georgetown 
University Law Center, where he was one of the youngest professors in the 
history of the university to receive tenure and a chaired professorship.  He 
was also Director of the Georgetown Center on National Security and the 
Law until his appointment as Principal Deputy Solicitor General at the 
Justice Department.  And he served as Visiting Professor at both Harvard 
and Yale.   
After graduating from Yale, he clerked for Guido Calabresi in the Second 
Circuit and then for Justice Breyer in the Supreme Court.  He has also 
served in the Deputy Attorney General’s Office at the Justice Department.  
He has published dozens of articles in scholarly law journals, many op-ed 
articles in such publications as The New York Times and The Washington 
Post.  He has testified numerous times before various committees of both 
the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate.  He represented Mr. 
Hamdan, bin Laden’s driver who was detained at Guantanamo, and 
successfully argued the landmark case of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,3 which 
established important limitations on the President’s power and judicial 
 
 2. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011). 
 3. 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
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review over the Guantanamo detentions.  He is the recipient of the very 
highest award given to a civilian by the U.S. Department of Justice, the 
Edmund Randolph Award, which the Attorney General presented to him 
last year.  The Chief Justice of the United States appointed him to the Rules 
Committees in 2011—the Advisory Committee on Federal Appellate Rules, 
chaired by Judge Sutton.  Additionally, he was named as one of the best 
lawyers in the world in so many places, I am not even going to tell you.  I 
would also add that he essentially owns C-SPAN.  You just tune in and you 
will see Neal Katyal talking about something.  And he rocked the house on 
The Colbert Report. 
I leave it now to Neal. 
PROF. KATYAL:  Thank you, Dan, for that really warm introduction.  It 
is funny, because we did not script this, but literally I have as the first lines 
of my lecture that “I fell in love with Fordham fifteen years ago this year at 
the AALS meat market when I met Dan Capra.”  I was giving a paper on 
criminal law.  I had just interviewed with the fancy schools—Harvard, 
Yale, etc.—and Dan showed them all up with the questions he asked me 
about my paper. 
It is a real honor to be here at Fordham.  When I decided that my life was 
going to be in D.C., and so I did not come to teach here, I did the next best 
thing, which, when Katyal II, my sister, was on the meat market, I said, 
“this is the place for you.”  It was perhaps the only time she has ever 
listened to me. 
Fordham is a place with an unparalleled combination of a world-class 
faculty, totally bright, interesting, engaged students, and students and 
faculty who think, not just about the theoretical complexities of law, but the 
real actual problems that all of us face as a country and as citizens.  So I 
love this place, and it is always a delight to be back here. 
When I last year confessed error4 in the Hirabayashi5 and Korematsu6 
cases—and I’ll explain what I mean in a minute—I thought about a forum 
in which to memorialize what I had done and why I had done it.  When Dan 
had suggested the auspices of the Reed Professorship and having the honor 
of publishing something in the Fordham Law Review, given my connection 
to the school, I jumped at the chance.  So that is what today’s lecture is— 
what I did, why I did it. 
In order to do that, I thought I would first explain a little bit about what 
true confession of error is.  It is actually one of the most remarkable things 
in our legal system.  I know that a component of the Reed Professorship is 
legal ethics.  To me there is no greater institution that shows really what 
true legal ethics is about than the confession-of-error practice by the 
 
 4. Neal Katyal, Confession of Error:  The Solicitor General’s Mistakes During the 
Japanese-American Internment Cases, JUST. BLOG (May 20, 2011), http://blogs.justice.gov/
main/archives/1346. 
 5. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). 
 6. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
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Solicitor General.  Here is what it is:  It is the Solicitor General telling a 
court—typically the Supreme Court, but sometimes a lower court—“You 
know that case we won, Court?  We shouldn’t have won that case.  We 
should have actually lost that case.  So please take this case, Supreme 
Court, on certiorari, agree to hear the case, and rule against the 
government.”  That is a remarkable thing for an advocate to do—an 
advocate who, as we all know from our first class in legal ethics, is charged 
to “zealously” advocate for her or his client.7  And yet, you have the lawyer 
saying, “Actually the client, at least on the paper, the United States 
government, should have lost the case that it had won.” 
Confessions of error have a long history.  From the very beginning of the 
Solicitor General’s position, we have had confessions of error.  For 
example, in 1891, Solicitor General and later President and Chief Justice 
William Howard Taft admitted to an error in a case in Texas.8  It was a 
murder case that was prosecuted in the Eastern District of Texas and, 
according to Taft, certain hearsay evidence had come into the trial that 
shouldn’t have come in.  So he told the Court to reverse the conviction.  
That led the Court, in an opinion by the first Justice Harlan, to state that:  
“The representatives of government, in this court, frankly concede, as it was 
their duty to do, that this action of the court below was so erroneous as to 
entitle the defendants to a reversal.”9 
Since Taft, all Solicitors General—it doesn’t matter whether they are 
appointed by a Republican or a Democrat—have confessed error, roughly at 
the pace of two to three times per Supreme Court term.  It spans, as I say, 
politics.  Solicitor General Bork, for example, identified as a prominent 
conservative, confessed error—as did Charles Fried, Kenneth Starr, and so 
on, and as well did the Solicitors General appointed by Democratic 
presidents. 
Confessing error does not always win popularity points.  For instance, 
imagine you are the lower-court judge to whom the government said, “We 
should win this case,” and the lower court listens to the government.  And 
then the Solicitor General later on turns around and says, “Actually, we 
should not have won that case.  You are wrong.”  This is what Learned 
Hand, one of our most distinguished judges ever to serve on the court of 
appeals, said:  “It’s bad enough to have the Supreme Court reverse you, but 
I will be damned if I will be reversed by some Solicitor General.”10  And of 
course, the decision to confess may be unpopular with the prosecutors at the 
Justice Department, or others, who worked really hard to try and secure that 
conviction, to defend it in the court of appeals, and then you have this 
 
 7. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. (2012). 
 8. See Cook v. United States, 138 U.S. 157 (1891). 
 9. Id. at 185. 
 10. Archibald Cox, The Government in the Supreme Court, 44 CHI. B. REC. 221, 225 
(1963) (quoting Judge Learned Hand). 
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bureaucrat in Washington saying, “No, we’ve got to do this the other way,” 
and it is flipped. 
Despite those kinds of institutional reluctances to confess error, it has 
been an enduring and endearing practice.  I think it stems from the Solicitor 
General’s obligation to the court, which is much broader than the 
immediate case at hand.  It is really, truly, an interest in doing justice.  It is 
said that when Frederick Lehmann—one of the Solicitors General, roughly 
eighty years ago—when he confessed error for the first time, he was heard 
muttering the words that are carved on top of the Attorney General’s 
conference room, which is:  “The United States wins its point whenever 
justice is done its citizens in the courts.”11 
The practice of confessing error is also crucial to highlighting the 
responsibility of candor that the Solicitor General has with the court system.  
That is, the courts can’t be experts in everything, and they of course depend 
upon the government to be absolutely straight with them.  Obviously, as a 
government lawyer, you are always an advocate for a client.  But that client 
is the United States, and that includes all of its citizens and all of its various 
interests.  It is not as if the interest is always 100 percent in favor of 
conviction.  There are other ideals and interests that are at work.  That is 
what I think underlies the practice of the Solicitor General’s confession of 
error. 
Today, I want to talk about something different.  It is a different mistake.  
It is not a confession of error in the sense that the Solicitor General came 
into the court and said, “We should not have won this.”  Because, after all, 
the series of events I am going to discuss occurred a long time ago.  It 
occurred in the aftermath of the attacks at Pearl Harbor in 1941.  So there 
isn’t really a mechanism to confess error in the way that I was just talking 
about.  But I do think some of the same institutional principles apply; 
namely, that it is of utmost importance that we correct mistakes when we 
make them. 
I do not mean in this lecture to judge Charles Fahy, the Solicitor General 
at the time, during this World War II episode.  I have made mistakes and so 
too have all of us as humans.  I believe that good people can do bad things 
and bad people can do good things.  And I do not mean to attack him.  But I 
do mean to say that the genius of the American system, from its checks and 
balances laced into Articles I to III, to the First Amendment, is all about the 
idea that good people can make mistakes, and it is up to all of us to remind 
each other of those mistakes and to learn from them.  As Emerson said, 
“Bad times have a scientific value.  These are occasions a good learner 
would not miss.”12 
 
 11. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (“An inscription on the walls of the 
Department of Justice states the proposition candidly for the federal domain:  ‘The United 
States wins its point whenever justice is done its citizens in the courts.’”). 
 12. RALPH WALDO EMERSON, THE CONDUCT OF LIFE 230 (1860). 
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So with that, let me talk about what Charles Fahy as Solicitor General 
did.  As I say, he had a remarkable career.  After his service as Solicitor 
General, he served on the D.C. Circuit for thirty years.  But in these two 
cases that I want to highlight, in the case of Gordon Hirabayashi and Fred 
Korematsu, I do think that errors were made.  The Japanese internment had 
its origins with the bombing of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.  In 
February of 1942, President Roosevelt authorized military commanders to 
declare areas of the United States as military areas from which many or all 
people may be excluded.13  The next month, in March of 1942, Lieutenant 
General John DeWitt of the Army issued a public proclamation that stated 
that the Pacific Coast was “subject to attack, to attempted invasion,” and he 
imposed restrictions on “all persons of Japanese ancestry, whether they 
were American citizens or not.”14  By that I mean people who were simply 
of Japanese ancestry.  They may have never set foot in Japan, they may 
have been born in the United States, their parents may have been born in the 
United States; but if they had Japanese ancestry there were special 
restrictions placed upon them. 
A few brave citizens thought to challenge this scheme.  One was Gordon 
Hirabayashi, a Seattle native and University of Washington student, who 
voluntarily turned himself in to the FBI—so he violated a curfew order on 
purpose and then went to the FBI and said, “Here is what I did.”  
Hirabayashi was a remarkable individual.  He, sadly, just died a month ago.  
His story is, I think, instructive for all of us.  He had a religious upbringing 
that was very similar to the Quaker tradition.  As part of that tradition, he 
felt that he should resist unjust laws.  But he also felt bound to obey edicts 
under those laws.  So he challenged the system.  He said:  “I have violated 
the curfew.” 
When the Hirabayashi appeal reached the Solicitor General’s Office, it 
attracted the attention of Edward Ennis, a man who had previously served 
in the Solicitor General’s Office as a line attorney.  He had moved to the 
Justice Department’s Alien Enemy Control Unit.  But he nonetheless wrote 
to Fahy and urged him to dismiss these cases.  Fahy, though, rejected 
Ennis’s suggestion and instructed him to oppose the appeal.15  And so the 
government began drafting its legal brief.  Perhaps the most noteworthy 
characteristic of the brief filed by Solicitor General Fahy defending the 
curfew and exclusion policy is what Fahy did not tell the Court.  The 
Solicitor General, in particular, did not present evidence that cast doubt on 
the military’s assessment of the situation.  When the Office was drafting the 
 
 13. Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 19, 1942). 
 14. There are a number of military proclamations and orders implicated here—Military 
Proclamation No. 1 was March 2, 1942.  The Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34 regarding 
relocation centers was issued on May 3, 1942. 
 15. PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR:  THE STORY OF THE JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT 
CASES 167 (1983) (citing Memorandum from Edward J. Ennis, Dir., Alien Enemy Control 
Unit, Dep’t of Justice, to Charles Fahy, Solicitor Gen. (Jan. 8, 1943) (on file with the 
Records of the Department of Justice)). 
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brief in the Hirabayashi case, Ennis found out about a report written by 
Kenneth Ringle, a report that represented the Office of Naval Intelligence’s 
views on the Japanese-American situation.16  The Ringle Report said that 
the Navy did not believe that mass internment of Japanese-Americans was 
justifiable.  It stated that only a tiny percentage, at most, of Japanese-
Americans were potentially disloyal; that the ones who were disloyal were 
almost all known to the government; and any other problems could be 
handled on an individual basis.  The report concluded:  “[T]he entire 
‘Japanese Problem’ has been magnified out of its true proportion, largely 
because of the physical characteristics of the people.”17  I should say that J. 
Edgar Hoover, not known as some civil libertarian, agreed that the mass 
internment was problematic. 
In light of the Ringle Report, Ennis wrote a memo to Solicitor General 
Fahy saying that the Justice Department had to “consider most carefully 
what our obligation to the Court is.”18  The Ringle Report, after all, 
contradicted what the government was saying in its draft brief to the 
Supreme Court—that the individualized screening of Japanese-Americans 
couldn’t work. 
Ennis continued in his memo to the Solicitor General:   
I think we should consider very carefully whether we do not have a duty 
to advise the Court of the existence of the Ringle memorandum and of the 
fact that this represents the view of the Office of Naval Intelligence.  It 
occurs to me that any other course of conduct might approximate the 
suppression of evidence.19 
What does Fahy do?  He does not alert the Court.  Instead he argues in 
the brief, contrary to the Ringle Report, that mass internment was necessary 
and that individual hearings are impossible.  The brief stated:  “If those 
Japanese who might aid the enemy were either known or readily 
identifiable, the task of segregating them would probably have been 
comparatively simple.”20  And the brief noted the “virtually impossible task 
of promptly segregating the potentially disloyal from the loyal.”21 
The brief made no mention of the Ringle Report.  Instead, the brief had a 
whole bunch of pages about the “racial characteristics of Japanese-
Americans,” and it had pages arguing that the Japanese-Americans lacked 
in assimilation, that  
 
 16. KENNETH RINGLE, RINGLE REPORT ON JAPANESE INTERNMENT (1941), available at 
http://www.history.navy.mil/library/online/jap%20intern.htm. 
 17. Id. § I.h. 
 18. Memorandum from Edward J. Ennis, Dir., Alien Enemy Control Unit, Dep’t of 
Justice, to Charles H. Fahy, Solicitor Gen. (Apr. 30, 1943), available at http://research.
archives.gov/description/296058. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Brief for the United States at 61, Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) 
(No. 870). 
 21. Id. at 63. 
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it is entirely possible that an unknown number of the Japanese may lack to 
some extent a feeling of loyalty toward the United States as a result of 
their treatment, and may feel a consequent tie to Japan, a heightened sense 
of racial solidarity, and a compensatory feeling of racial pride or pride in 
Japan’s achievements.22   
The brief went on to say that the schools that were on the West Coast that 
Japanese citizens had set up to teach the Japanese language were “a 
convenient medium for indoctrinating the pupils with Japanese nationalistic 
philosophy.”23 
Well, this got the Court to ask a couple questions about the brief.  So 
former Solicitor General Robert Jackson asked Fahy at the oral argument 
whether it would be permissible to criminalize, in peacetime, conduct 
committed by an Irishman but not another person.  Fahy responded:  
“Certainly this could not be done in peacetime.  What makes it reasonable 
now is the war power and the circumstances of war.  We do not admit, 
however, that there is any discrimination involved.”24  Fahy’s reason for 
there being no discrimination was the Japanese schools and all these other 
things that the brief had pointed to.  And the fear of Japanese-Americans 
“was not based on race but on these other facts,” as Fahy put it in his 
argument.  In June of 1943, the Court unanimously upheld Hirabayashi’s 
conviction, finding that the military had “reasonable ground for believing 
the threat is real.”25  Of course, the Supreme Court was never told about the 
Ringle memo. 
Even more famous than the Hirabayashi case is the Korematsu case,26 
which I know every law student knows.  Korematsu tested whether or not 
the exclusion of Japanese-Americans from the West was constitutional.  As 
with Hirabayashi, I think the most notable characteristic of the brief the 
government filed is what it did not tell the Court.  Here, the story involves a 
bit of Edward Ennis, this man I told you about before, but also another man, 
John Burling.  Burling was also serving in the Alien Enemy Control Unit.  
The government had been arguing in these Japanese internment cases, 
based on General DeWitt’s report, that Japanese-Americans were signaling 
to people offshore, perhaps via submarines, intelligence data about what the 
United States was doing—troop movements and the like. 
Now, the problem with this is that the FBI and the FCC had both studied 
this and found no evidence supporting this allegation.  So Burling tells Fahy 
that the Justice Department had “substantially incontrovertible evidence” 
that General DeWitt’s justification for internment was wrong and that “in 
all probability” General DeWitt knew that when he wrote his report 
 
 22. Id. at 21. 
 23. Id. at 30. 
 24. Arguments Before the Court: Military Control of Civilians, 11 U.S.L.W. 3347 (May 
18, 1943). 
 25. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 95. 
 26. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
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justifying the internment.27  At that time, Burling had been writing a draft 
of the brief in Korematsu to be filed in the Supreme Court by the Solicitor 
General, and he openly repudiates in his draft brief the final report when it 
comes to this language. 
When—and this is true today—whenever a draft brief is written, it is 
circulated to all the client agencies for their review so they make sure that 
they are okay with it, and they often have different suggestions of one form 
or another.  At that point, the War Department, now called the Pentagon, 
raised serious objections to the footnote that Burling had put in that was 
repudiating General DeWitt.  Fahy then says that he is inclined to go with 
the War Department—after all, they are the lead agency when it comes to 
fighting a war, and they are objecting to this footnote. 
Well, Ennis now gets involved with Burling and they do something very 
unusual.  They actually wrote a memo to someone lower in the Justice 
Department than the Solicitor General.  They write a memo to the Assistant 
Attorney General in charge of the Criminal Division, Herbert Wechsler.  
Wechsler is a legendary figure.  Wechsler is the guy who wrote the Model 
Penal Code, for example.  He was a professor at Columbia, a man of 
enormous distinction.  But nonetheless it is a lower-ranking person.  It is a 
very unusual thing to go down instead of up.  But they did know that 
Wechsler was a man of serious principle. 
So they write to Wechsler.  The memo says that the Justice Department 
had “an ethical obligation to the Court to refrain from citing” the final 
report.28  They said that it was “highly unfair to this racial minority that 
these lies, put out in an official publication, go uncorrected,” and “[t]he 
Attorney General should not be deprived of the present, and perhaps only, 
chance to set the record straight.”29  Ennis and Burling even said that they 
would not sign their names to the brief unless the final report was 
repudiated in some way.30  Wechsler then drafts a footnote—footnote 
two—and this is what ultimately appears in the brief.  There is some more 
story behind this but I will condense it for this point.  Here is what the brief 
says:  “The Final Report of General DeWitt . . . is relied on in this brief for 
statistics and other details concerning the actual evacuation and the events 
that took place subsequent thereto.  We have specifically recited in this 
brief the facts relating to the justification for the evacuation, of which we 
 
 27. IRONS, supra note 15, at 285 (quoting Letter from John L. Burling, Asst. Dir., Alien 
Enemy Control Unit, Dep’t of Justice, to Charles Fahy, Solicitor Gen. (April 13, 1944) (on 
file with the Fahy Papers, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library)). 
 28. Id. at 288 (quoting Letter from Edward J. Ennis, Dir., Alien Enemy Control Unit, 
Dep’t of Justice, to Herbert Wechsler, Asst. Att’y Gen., War Div. (Sept. 30, 1944) (on file 
with the Fahy Papers, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library)). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 290 (citing Letter from from John L. Burling, Asst. Dir., Alien Enemy Control 
Unit, Dep’t of Justice, to Edward J. Ennis, Dir., Alien Enemy Control Unit, Dep’t of Justice 
(October 2, 1944) (on file with the Records of the Department of Justice)). 
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ask the Court to take judicial notice, and we rely upon the Final Report only 
to the extent that it relates to such facts.”31 
This is a very common thing.  It happens today in the government.  You 
have this dispute between different agencies—the State Department wants 
one thing, the Pentagon wants another; or HHS wants one thing, Treasury 
wants another.  The general counsels often come back to you and they say, 
“Well, let’s finesse the issue.  Let’s just write something that kind of 
genuflects to both sides.”  They think it solves the problem, because if you 
are writing a memo or something like that, it is a pretty good solution.  You 
just paper over a disagreement. 
The problem is that, in the Supreme Court, there is this little thing called 
an oral argument that follows any sort of compromise or finessing footnote.  
That is precisely what happened here.  I sure hope I never wrote a footnote 
like that, because—I read it to you—I do not know what it means.  I have 
read this footnote perhaps thirty times, and I still do not know what it 
means. 
The Court did not know what it meant either.  So they essentially asked 
Fahy at the argument:  “What does this mean?  Are you repudiating the 
General DeWitt final report?”  Here is what Fahy says, and this is the part I 
find most problematic:   
There is nothing in the brief of the Government which is any different in 
this respect from the position it has always maintained since the 
Hirabayashi case, that not only the military judgment of the general, but 
the judgment of the Government of the United States, has always been in 
justification of the measures taken; and no person in any responsible 
position has ever taken a contrary position, and the Government does not 
do so now.  Nothing in its brief can be validly used to the contrary.32   
That is what he tells the Supreme Court of the United States at oral 
argument.  After he knew about the FCC, after he knew about the FBI, after 
he knew about the Ringle memo, after Ennis, after Burling, that is what he 
does.  And the Supreme Court, by 6–3, rules in favor of the government 
against Korematsu, relying once again on the Hirabayashi rationale of 
military necessity. 
I do think the Court shares some blame in this as well.  But  the Court is a 
generalist institution, and particularly in times of war they have to rely on 
the government’s submissions to be absolutely straight and reflect all the 
facts.  They are not experts in reading intelligence reports and assessing 
counterintelligence operations; they necessarily depend on the executive 
branch to play it straight with them.   
There is a brighter end to this story.  In the 1980s a historian named Peter 
Irons started through the Freedom of Information Act requesting 
 
 31. Brief for the United States at 11 n.2, Korematsu, 323 U.S. 214 (No. 22). 
 32. Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591, 603 n.13 (9th Cir. 1987). 
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information, and he is the one who uncovered much of this information,33 
and then others uncovered more of it.  Gordon Hirabayashi and Fred 
Korematsu filed petitions for writs of coram nobis in district court.  These 
are writs that say that there was an error committed and reverse a conviction 
on the basis of that.  You can only do so when other remedies are 
unavailable, and here of course these convictions were almost a half-
century before, and so that was a mechanism for the courts to try and deal 
with the situation. 
In 1984, a federal district judge in San Francisco granted Korematsu’s 
petition after finding that the government had not released critical 
information possessed by the Navy and the FCC.34  And, in 1987, the Ninth 
Circuit ruled in favor of Hirabayashi’s petition for similar reasons.35  The 
Ninth Circuit emphasized “the traditionally special relationship between the 
Supreme Court and the Solicitor General which permits the Solicitor 
General to make broad use of judicial notice and commands special 
credence from the Court,”36 and the court said they thought it unlikely that 
the Supreme Court would have “reached the same result even if the 
Solicitor General had advised . . . the Court of the true basis for General 
DeWitt’s orders.”37 
But the Supreme Court’s decisions in Hirabayashi and Korematsu still 
stand as laws of the case.  These are, of course, arguments that were 
products of their time.  But I think the most remarkable thing about this 
story is that at the time, even in the midst of crisis—when we were fighting 
a war on two fronts, when we had been so horribly attacked at Pearl 
Harbor—there were people within the government saying:  “Wait a minute.  
We can’t say that.  That’s wrong.” 
Churchill once said, “Criticism may not be agreeable but it is necessary.  
It fulfills the same function as pain in the human body:  it calls attention to 
an unhealthy state of things.”38  In the Japanese-American internment cases, 
the Solicitor General got that criticism at the time, and I think it is worth 
remembering those voices today, those voices of Edward Ennis and John 
Burling, who vigorously advocated that the Solicitor General provide a true, 
complete, accurate picture to the Court about what really led to the 
internment. 
In my judgment, those voices of dissent within the Office were right and 
the Solicitor General was wrong. 
Thank you. 
 
 33. See generally IRONS, supra note 15. 
 34. See Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984). 
 35. See Hirabayashi, 828 F.2d at 608. 
 36. Id. at 602. 
 37. Id. 
 38. See, e.g., Michelle M. Harner, The Value of “Thinking Like a Lawyer,” 70 MD. L. 
REV. 390, 399–400 (2011). 
